Introduction
Orthodox resistance to changes in Jewish law is, arguably, a strategic self-representation. Orthodox communities are responsive at times to the preferences of the larger society, even in relation to gender issues that distinguish Orthodoxy from non-Orthodox Judaisms. To fully understand the permeability of rabbinic discourse on gender, it is helpful to examine attitudes toward transsexuality-that is, toward persons who, previously known as males or females, present themselves following hormonal treatment and sex-change surgery (SCS) as the other sex, male-to-female or female-to-male (MtF, FtM). 1 Transsexuality challenges, profoundly, the theological assumption of a created human nature: Men are men, women are women. Sexual dimorphism is an inescapable, naturalized presupposition of Western (if not all) societies. 2 One might well say that this binary is what makes the entire sex-differentiated map of Orthodox Judaism workable. To be sure, rabbinic discourse has ancient categories (e.g., androginos) that could make space for gender variance. Yet, instantiated throughout Orthodoxy, especially in its ultra-Orthodox (ḥaredi) forms, the gender binary is foundational to individual duties and aspirations, to the regulation of family and communal life, and to the allocation of ritual practices and spaces. It is hard to imagine how Orthodoxy could tolerate SCS and integrate transsexuals into such a gender-differentiated formation. Likewise, rabbinic views of SCS are tied to struggles within Orthodox culture to control sexuality. As scholars have shown, attitudes toward transsexuality intersect with the history and regulation of homosexuality, even though the linkages are seldom articulated in rabbinic texts. 3 Accordingly, Orthodox approaches to transsexuality can help us understand the resilience of traditionalist rabbinic law on gender and sexuality.
While scholars have delved deeply into SCS in the general society, much less attention has been paid to the reception of SCS and transsexuals in Orthodox Judaism. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine Orthodox legal discourse on SCS, a corpus overlooked in Jewish gender studies, notwithstanding its significant repercussions. To identify shifts in the history of Orthodox approaches to SCS, this analysis encompasses halakhic texts from the 1970s to the past decade. 4 The aim is to look carefully and below the surface, to characterize the repertoire of rhetorical and practical Jewish legal stances on SCS and transsexuality. The texts I peruse include published responsa, articles in rabbinic journals and halakhic pronouncements on the internet. Above all, I analyze an extensive 2004 monograph published by an Israeli Orthodox rabbi, Edan Ben-Ephraim, entitled Dor tahepukhot (Generation of perversions). 5 Ben-Ephraim has put a formidable document into play within the Orthodox Jewish community. Dor tahepukhot differs from other rabbinic texts on SCS in three significant ways. First, Ben-Ephraim is based in the Sefardi religious community, which differs in some of its views from the Ashkenazi yeshiva system that has largely dominated halakhic discourse in North America and Israel. He studied at Yeshivat Ḥazon Ovadia under Yitzḥak Yosef, son of the late renowned halakhic scholar and Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel Ovadia Yosef and now himself the Sefardi Chief Rabbi. 6 Second, perhaps on account of his Sefardi perspective, he makes extensive use of rabbinic lore (agadah) and mysticism (kabalah; see below) in discussing what is essentially a legal issue. Third, Ben-Ephraim offers the first book-length treatment of SCS, framed as a systematic guide to practical halakhah (e.g., pp. 9ff.) To be sure, his mixing of senior rabbinic opinions with his own more novice interpretations makes the book come across more as a scholarly exercise than as an authoritative text; it received approbations from major rabbinic authorities, but such approbations are common, and BenEphraim himself has neither the discursive clout nor the reputation of their authors. 7 Nonetheless, in its scope and analytical intensity, his tome outdoes the preceding responsa and incidental Orthodox writings on SCS. Ben-Ephraim's curiosity leaves no law sacrosanct, no viewpoint or ruling beyond reproach; even established opinions are tested and retested. This thorough engagement with the topic is a rabbinic practice that opens up conversations rather than shutting them down.
In subtle ways, Ben-Ephraim's work marks a nascent shift in Orthodox thinking about SCS. This article explores these shifts in rabbinic legal discourse in three sections, on, respectively, the legality of SCS, the postoperative assignment of sex for the purposes of Jewish law, and the regulation of transsexuality in day-to-day Orthodox life. In each case, to highlight the transitions underway in Orthodox discourse, my analysis contrasts prior halakhic texts with the approaches taken in Ben-Ephraim's pioneering monograph. As shown in two further sections, potential changes in rabbinic law are shaped by the psychiatric perspective on transsexuality, which decouples biological sex and gender, and by popular conceptions of the gendered soul. These sections compare Ben-Ephraim's views with the innovative opinion of modern Orthodox Rabbi Dror Brama.
Lest the reader harbor unrealistic expectations, make no mistake: None of the transitions in Orthodox discourse are as revolutionary as those propagated by queer theory or the contemporary struggle for legal rights for transsexuals. I ask, rather, whether Orthodoxy's small ripples reveal an instability, a dialogical response to the waves of change set in motion by SCS. In its own terms, perhaps traditionalist Judaism is also queering gender identities for Jewish law purposes. While not seeking directly to overturn halakhic rules against SCS, this emerging Orthodox discourse may have opened up interpretive space for sympathetic responses to transsexual persons.
Legality of SCS: Prohibition and Its Rhetorical Expression

Early Rhetorical Responses
Every Orthodox rabbinic text on SCS deems it prohibited under Jewish law. 8 According to these texts, Jews who willingly undergo SCS or perform it on others have committed serious transgressions of biblical rules, as understood in Jewish law and ethics. Nevertheless, the reasoning and rhetorical expression of this judgment have varied in several important ways.
When SCS first came to the attention of Orthodox halakhic commentators, their reactions ran a gamut. During the 1960s-70s, several rabbinic decisors and Jewish medical ethicists-J. David Bleich, Lev Grossnass, Avraham Hirsch, Avraham Steinberg and others-wrote neutrally or even sympathetically about transsexuals. 9 To be sure, such sympathy is attained by pathologizing the transsexual. For instance, Bleich speaks kindly of Jan Morris's Conundrum and refers to transsexuality as a "tragic condition." 10 By contrast, most authors of a series of responses compiled by the Hebrew ultraOrthodox rabbinic journal Hama'or in 1972 were shocked by SCS, denied its relevance to their community and called for an uncompromising stance against any future Jewish transsexuals. A hasidic rabbi, Shalom Krausz, opened his response by questioning the need for any response at all: "In my opinion, this is beyond the bounds of abomination, and it is not worthwhile wasting time suitable for studying Torah to clarify this disgusting matter for them in a responsum."
11 Such rhetoric condemns transsexuality by way of a "politics of disgust," specifically allusion to biblical language on homosexuality. 12 Another responder with roots in the rabbinic leadership of the Satmar hasidic community, R. Hananya Yom Tov Lipa Teitelbaum, used aptly surgical imagery: "If this plague [makah] spreads, God forbid, among Jews, we need to gather teachers and rabbis together, to unify, all as one, in mind and soul . . . with a sharp knife [sakina ḥarifta] against this outbreak."
Though articulating an opinion on the law, these rabbis exhorted in a theological vein by characterizing SCS as an attack on the divinely ordained natural order-a more subjective and discretionary principle than, say, the biblical prohibition of castration. Teitelbaum wrote: "God created the world and made all forms appropriate and complete. One should not change it at all, and any change is against the will of the Creator." 13 Krausz compared SCS to the forbidden mixing of seeds, which he saw as grounded in the divine concern for the natural order, 14 and to sorcery, which also contravenes "the natural way that was established at the beginning of creation." 15 Condemnation of SCS could mean utter rejection of transsexual persons themselves. Teitelbaum stated that Jewish transsexuals should be considered no longer Jewish and subjected to a rare banning from the Jewish community:
In my humble opinion, anyone who acts thusly to surgically remove the male organs, in order to change to female, is in the category of a person who leaves Judaism. [ The person] is no longer classified as a Jew and is legally considered . . . an apostate to the entire Torah . . . and thereby governed by the laws for non-Jews. . . . If the state allows us to issue [a ḥerem, a religious ban] then it is a mitzvah to ban and separate from and expel this person completely from the community of Israel. 16 However, Hama'or editor Meir Amsel, who had solicited his colleagues' responsa, explained why, in his view, Orthodox rabbis should respond seriously to SCS in Jewish legal terms. The ultra-Orthodox (ḥaredi) world should not lock itself up like a fortress and pretend that "our Jews" would never be involved with transsexuality. Amsel predicted that "the licentious and derelict influence [of society] would also enter the [ḥaredi] camp," so that rabbis would eventually have to rule on the issue. To justify his rabbinic analysis of a hypothetical future with Orthodox postsurgery transsexuals, he mentioned other situations that merit halakhic deliberations for anticipated problems and argued that SCS, from a halakhic point of view, is no worse than apostasy or forbidden marriage. Anticipating that some transsexuals would repent of their error and seek a halakhic, observant life, Amsel argued that Orthodoxy should welcome these "unusual creatures," provided they repent, and educate them about how to conduct themselves according to halakhah. Such sinners could participate in the Orthodox community, and MtF transsexuals, even without repentance, could perform such male-specific religious duties as the priestly benediction, because otherwise they would always be adding sins for dereliction of duty.
In the 1970s, Orthodox Judaism was confronting a new reality, a new plateau in the capabilities of medical science. Yet, Orthodox rabbis were comfortable with the trope of claiming that SCS is actually not new but eerily familiar, and that it had already been anticipated and competently addressed by ancient and medieval rabbinic thought. With a kind of perverse pride, they cited ancient precursors, pointing, for example, to the midrashim according to which Adam and Eve were created as a single, androgynous being, not unlike Siamese twins who are later separated, 18 and Dinah, sister of Jacob's twelve sons, was changed in utero from a male to a female on account of her mother Leah's prayer; 19 and to the talmudic story of the sage Rava creating a golem, a new kind of being-though this comparison implies a critique. 20 In a similar, albeit harsher vein, Amsel was convinced that "if we knew all the details of the abominations of Egypt and Canaan, there is no doubt . . . that this monstrosity [i.e., transsexuality] was one of their lewd ways."
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With this not uncommon hermeneutic, the bodies of transsexuals merge in the rabbinic imagination with bodies imagined by ancient Jewish lore. For most authors, these legendary precursors to transsexuality do not function formally in legal argumentation but rather lend an air of competency to the rabbis' handling of a seeming medical innovation. Avraham Hirsch, an Orthodox rabbi associated for many decades with World Agudath Israel, too, reinforces rabbinic competency in citing the Kuzari (4:25) on the similar structure of male and female sexual organs 22 and, in referring along with other commentators, to the early modern responsa of Ḥayim Pelaggi and Ḥayim Miranda on persons with intersex conditions. 23 While thus demonstrating their virtuosity with rabbinic literature, the Orthodox rabbis who discussed SCS in the 1970s listed these analogous cases and principles haphazardly. A more nuanced use of these variegated cases would have to wait a few more decades.
Dor tahepukhot
To this day, Orthodox rabbinic authorities oppose efforts by transsexual persons to change their sex organs or secondary sexual characteristics, whether through surgery or through hormonal treatment. No Orthodox authority accepts sexual transition as the proper management of gender dysphoria. SCS is said to violate biblical law, the strictest category of prohibition-especially the rule against castration, but also the prohibitions on cross-dressing and changing the natural order. Over time, rabbinic authors have invoked additional Jewish legal principles that they believe would prohibit SCS, but the conclusion has remained constant. In 2002, for instance, Israeli Orthodox medical ethicist Yigal Shafran emphasized that the surgery is not only forbidden and ugly, but also a "severe abomination." 24 Now let us consider Ben-Ephraim's Dor tahepukhot, the most creative and comprehensive work in the 50-year history of Jewish law on SCS. In its 307 pages, Dor tahepukhot covers an unexpectedly wide spectrum of SCS topics, including surgeries, the rabbinic approach to scientific "novelties," the prohibition on SCS, dozens of laws that might govern postoperative transsexuals, secular laws, relations with non-Jews, homosexuality, the status of androginos (a person with an intersex condition), genetic engineering, the maternity of cloned persons, women in religious rituals, the marriage of two transsexuals, and debates about rabbinic sources. 25 Ben-Ephraim also describes how he came to investigate the topic, when he befriended a newly observant friend (a ba'al teshuvah) who had a transsexual (FtM) sister (p. 9). Through his monograph, Ben-Ephraim undertakes to identify and analyze each Jewish law that might prohibit SCS. While it is a theoretical work rather than an authoritative rabbinic ruling, it may set the intellectual and rhetorical stage for future directions in halakhic discourse.
At first glance, Dor tahepukhot comes across as a no-holds-barred attack on transsexuality, as Ben-Ephraim examines a dozen distinct prohibitions against SCS. Nonetheless, it might strike an observer that the more his list of violations expands, the less definitive it appears. After all, if SCS were irrefutably outlawed by any single biblical rule, why would halakhic texts need to creatively propose more laws that might prohibit it? Perhaps the cumulative recitation of violations is expected to resonate with some readers, but those attentive to legal argumentation may be left unpersuaded.
In reviewing the intricacies of each apparent prohibition, moreover, Ben-Ephraim manages to dig up or hint at leniencies-at reasons why the prohibition might not apply to some or all types of SCS. For instance, the biblical castration rule applies most clearly to the surgeon-not to the patient, though the latter might be liable for the prior arrangements that put the surgery in place. Transsexual patients could still be forbidden to abet the surgeon's sin, but their own sin might be limited, insofar as they are anesthetized at the time of the prohibited action (p. 57). 26 Ben-Ephraim further asks if the injunction against the surgeon might be malleable if a non-Jewish surgeon is involved.
Furthermore, Ben-Ephraim shows that the strongest legal rationale for a clear-cut ban on SCS, the biblical prohibition of castration, applies differently to women, who are not punished for what the rabbis consider the female equivalent of castration-a nuance that had already drawn attention. 27 While it might seem to derive solely from longstanding Jewish law, this asymmetry in the rabbinic treatment of FtM transsexuality echoes the asymmetry, in the general population, between the transition experiences of natal males as opposed to females. Natal females (FtMs) are more inclined toward nonsurgical options, adjust more smoothly to transition regardless of surgery, and are less likely, medically, socially and psychologically, to be perceived as needing surgery. 28 Jewish law applies a severe injunction against MtF surgery, in effect matching the greater demand by MtF transsexuals, while adopting a far more lenient approach to FtM persons, seemingly in line with their lesser need or demand for genital surgery.
Ben-Ephraim uncovers additional leniencies. For instance, SCS is often said to be prohibited on account of the biblical ban on wearing garments of the opposite sex. Ben-Ephraim shows how this ban's application to SCS could be disputed. After all, the surgery itself does not involve any items to be worn, 29 and if SCS reassigns a person's sex, then the rule would be moot. 30 Likewise, he questions whether SCS would contravene the halakhic prohibition against changing the created order. He points out that the rule might only apply to changes brought about by sorcery (kishuf), and he doubts that the divine fiat (ḥok) against mixed species can be adapted to cover SCS merely by speculative reasoning. By the same token, Dor tahepukhot seems to undermine efforts to prohibit SCS as profaning God's name (so does soccer, notes Ben-Ephraim-p. 58) and as transgressing the biblical laws regarding damaged male genitalia (patzua' daka' and kerut shofkhah), which would regulate only postoperative relations and would not apply to FtM transsexuals (p. 671).
The book also touches on the prohibition against causing grief to one's parents and family, derived by rabbinic authorities from the obligation to honor one's parents and from other biblical laws (e.g., Deut. 27.16). Ben-Ephraim asserts that SCS causes grief and shame, even if the parents are not observant Jews. But he offers no evidence for this assertion, an omission that may implicitly index a leniency. Indeed, anticipating that some parents would accept their transsexual child, Ben-Ephraim asserts that such acceptance is irrelevant because the parents' shame is built into the situation. By making such flat and unsupported assertions, his relatively weak argument here opens the door to opposing arguments for leniency (e.g., that the Jewish law against causing parental grief might not apply under various contingencies).
To be sure, Ben-Ephraim presents several undiluted or unqualified prohibitions against SCS. In one short section, for instance, he argues that the surgery would violate the Jewish law against self-wounding. He states: "Though there is no concern about the prohibition against self-wounding whenever there is medical need . . . however, in our case [of SCS], since there is no medical need whatsoever," the prohibition applies (p. 55). 31 Still, one wonders whether his brief treatment of self-wounding might be read as implicitly pointing to the opportunity for an exemption based on "medical need"-as has been claimed. 32 A second clear violation, according to Dor tahepukhot, is that of nullifying the ability to procreate. Ben-Ephraim's analysis does not seem to leave much room to maneuver in this regard, save an exception for a person who has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation before undergoing SCS (p. 63). A third, related violation noted by Ben-Ephraim is that SCS might be considered to void the fulfillment of the procreation commandment by the transsexual's father. In explaining the problem, though, Ben-Ephraim of course points out that the father could fulfill this commandment through his other children.
Thus, if the basic thrust of Ben-Ephraim's book, and its upfront summary, affirm the prohibition of SCS, upon close examination the book in subtle ways undermines its own apparent condemnation. Perhaps this is an unavoidable outcome, to be expected of any in-depth monograph on a matter of rabbinic law, since the deep structure of talmudic reasoning is multivocal and pluralistic. Still, it means that indepth "insider" knowledge shaves away at the unwavering public face of prohibition. If Ben-Ephraim is partly subverting the law against SCS, he does so by chipping away at the multiplicity of reasons posed in its support-a death by a thousand paper cuts.
These leniencies are not the kind of sweeping exemption invoked by rabbinic authorities to permit outright other, even related, surgeries. Notably, rabbis have authorized cosmetic surgery for a patient's greater good, or the removal of reproductive organs (hysterectomy or orchiectomy) in cases of uterine or testicular cancer. This is not to say that Ben-Ephraim is unaware of the potential relevance of a pikuaḥ nefesh ("saving a life") exemption for SCS. Without any trace of irony, he applies that very principle in one instance: Penitent transsexual persons are allowed to surgically reverse their previous sex change (p. 126). Such surgery on the genitalia might be considered forbidden as an unnecessary medical risk, yet it could be justified, BenEphraim argues, if a psychiatrist verified that its denial would cause so much mental anguish as to constitute a danger. He goes on to adduce a series of halakhic rulings to justify reversal in cases of mental anguish.
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For the reader who favors SCS, this section of Dor tahepukhot seems counterintuitive, because, for the sake of lending rabbinic support to the possibility of reversal, a relatively rare event, Ben-Ephraim offers precisely those rulings that could be cited to justify SCS in the first place, as medically necessary to alleviate the mental anguish produced by gender dysphoria. Such reasoning also could conceivably be applied, ex post facto, to mitigate the illegality of SCS. One Orthodox transsexual told me that a prominent Orthodox rabbi had indicated privately that SCS can be understood as a kind of desperate act, committed under the duress ('ones) of emotional suffering. 35 This understanding of duress could be invoked to absolve the postoperative Jew of guilt for transgressing the rules against surgery. However, mental anguish would not suffice to condone or permit SCS ab initio. Nor would such an interpretation of duress go uncontested, if it were to be published. 36 
Rabbinic Debate on Postoperative Sex Assignments
Does SCS Effectively Reassign Sex under Jewish Law?
Once rabbinic thinkers faced the issue of SCS, an early and central question was whether the surgery would actually reassign patients' halakhic sex, that is, their sex identity for the purpose of Jewish law. Two contrary legal views soon emerged in this regard. One view accepts that the surgery does reassign halakhic sex, because the latter depends on outward appearances, especially external genitalia-that is, on phenotype. 37 The second view does not concede, ex post facto, that a man can become a woman, or vice versa, because it sees halakhic sex as depending, in effect, on one's underlying genetic situation-that is, on genotype. As we shall see, Ben-Ephraim supports a hybrid of these dichotomous approaches to halakhic sex assignment.
A key figure in the halakhic dispute over sex reassignment was R. Eliezer Waldenberg, a prominent Jewish medical ethicist in Israel. Over the course of a few years, Waldenberg wrote responsa on both SCS and pediatric intersex surgery, in both cases relying on the phenotypic argument. In a 1967 responsum, Waldenberg opined that SCS would alter a person's halakhic sex and marital situation. As precedents, he invoked two pre-modern responsa annulling the marriages of women who reportedly had been changed into men by natural causes. 38 Similarly, reasoned Waldenberg, since two persons of the same sex cannot be married to each other under Jewish law, SCS would automatically dissolve a transsexual's marriage, without the need for a get, a traditional Jewish divorce document. 39 42 From the genotype standpoint, surgery cannot change a person's sex for the purposes of Jewish law. Orthodox rabbis who favor genotype avoid the appearance of encouraging or validating SCS ex post facto. The Catholic Church has similarly rejected the surgical reassignment of sex, as have several U.S. states. 43 As could be expected, the two competing approaches to halakhic sex assignment (phenotype vs. genotype) are not based on the voluntary choice or self-identification of transsexual patients and their physicians. In contemporary secular biomedical law and ethics, patient choice is often the decisive factor. However, rabbinic medical ethics typically subordinates patient choice to such principles as the preservation of human life, the minimizing of pain and suffering, beneficence and nonmaleficence, human dignity, the fulfillment of biblical commandments, respect for rabbinic teachings and so on. As a result, as pivotal a Jewish law question as sex assignment is unlikely to hinge on patient choice. Understandably, Orthodox Jewish transsexuals oppose the assignment of a person's sex by genotype. Many postoperative transsexuals favor deciding sex by external appearance, since this approach recognizes the sex reassignment sought by surgery. 44 Two more recent developments favor the genotype view among Orthodox halakhic experts. First, Waldenberg's support for phenotypic sex assignment has been called into question, especially following a 1997 opinion in which he apparently treated a specific transsexual as an androginos. 45 Several rabbis have argued that the external appearances rule formulated by Waldenberg, who died in 2006, has been misconstrued, and that it should not apply to SCS, because the bodies of transsexuals have reconstructed genitalia, not their original, functioning genitalia. 46 Second, in a responsum relying largely on Waldenberg's approach based on external appearance, the Committee on Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement's Rabbinical Assembly has approved phenotypic reassignment of sex after sex change surgery. 47 Since Orthodox authorities tend to distance themselves from the views of the more modernist Conservative Movement, the latter's endorsement of Waldenberg could further undermine support for phenotypic sex assignment within Orthodox halakhic views.
If followed rigorously, the immutability of genotypic sex would certainly deter SCS and transsexuality. However, genotypic assignment of halakhic sex also has drawbacks. It can hardly describe historical understandings of halakhic sex in the era before chromosomal testing. It also does not suitably assign (halakhic) sex for certain intersex conditions. 48 Moreover, some Orthodox rabbis have started to rethink a flat genotypic formula for sex assignment regarding persons with intersex conditions. For example, Asher Weiss states that phenotype is primary, though he partly accommodates the use of genetic testing. 49 Citing legal precedents, Ben-Ephraim rejects the majority view that halakhic sex should be determined by genotype; like Waldenberg, 50 Before explaining why BenEphraim advocates this hybrid natal-phenotype approach, it is instructive to see how he would adjust the rabbinic regulatory regime for people whose halakhic sex does not match their postoperative presentation.
Regulation: How Should Jewish Law Treat Postoperative Transsexuals in Practice?
Whichever way transsexuals are assigned a sex for halakhic purposes, they can bring complex challenges into any Orthodox Jewish community in which they hope to participate. Women and men are distinguished throughout Jewish marriage and family law, of course, but also in numerous other areas of Orthodox Jewish life. Orthodox social space is choreographed by informal rules and by Jewish law governing physical contact, ritual segregation, the seclusion of individuals of opposite sexes together in closed spaces, text study and interaction between the sexes. In religious practices, men's obligations and ritual roles differ markedly from women's. Adherents of Jewish praxis are expected to act in line with their assigned sex and, accordingly, face strong incentives to resolve any uncertainties. In short, any Jew who does not conform to conventional sexual dimorphism will have a hard time fitting into Orthodox social spaces and religious practices.
Gradually, however, some Orthodox clergy and communities are encountering postoperative transsexuals who seek tolerance and inclusion. Accordingly, rabbinic scholars are endeavoring to figure out the repercussions of SCS for the religious observances of the individuals involved, as well as their families and communities. In view of the fundamental dispute over the sex assignment of transsexuals, postoperative transsexuals could face at least three regulatory schemes, depending upon whether their community's approach favors the assignment of sex by genotype, by phenotype, or perhaps by a hybrid view of the type suggested by Ben-Ephraim.
In communities where the view that assignment of halakhic sex is determined by genotype prevails, it is fair to assume that an MtF transsexual who appeared as female would not be allowed to function as a woman; and if they dressed in clothes typically worn by women, which would be understood as cross-dressing in violation of Jewish law, they would likely be excluded from men's roles as well. A community could still welcome violators of the cross-dressing law, but they might be excluded from most ritual and other religious activities. This is the majority view.
Alternatively, if the community accepts the assignation of sexual identity by phenotype (genitalia), transsexuals might be permitted to participate in line with their reassigned sexual identity. With phenotypic sex assignment, the postoperative transsexual has both a new halakhic sex and, in effect, the status of a new legal person-a status that may be unsettling, or worse. 51 Not only would a marriage be annulled, according to Waldenberg, after one partner undergoes sex change surgery, but, as Michael Broyde pointed out, this could imply that the transsexual loses their parental rights and duties, too. 52 Still, since the assigned sex would match the person's desired appearance, the phenotype approach offers transsexuals the least complicated entrée into communal Orthodox life. By recognizing the reassigned sex, an Orthodox community could allow the transsexual to participate in nearly all ritual practices and social interactions.
For better or worse, Jewish transsexuals confirm that the genotype vs. phenotype divide has resulted in polarized communal reactions to their presence. Several MtF transwomen told me about rabbis who would only accept them in their synagogues if they appeared as men. 53 Michelle spoke of feeling extremely humiliated by one Orthodox rabbi who addressed her in the synagogue, publicly, as a male. By contrast, another rabbi invited her home for Sabbath dinner and sat her among his daughters and other women in segregated seating. Similarly, Naomi told me that one rabbi called her crazy and insisted that she dress as a man if she wished to go to his synagogue. But another Orthodox rabbi told her that he is "LGBT positive." (I am not aware of any transsexual persons who participate in Jewish life by appearing as their genotypic or birth sex rather than their transitioned identity.) Even in Jewish communities where rabbis technically recognize a reassigned sex, transsexuals may not feel welcome, as they are subjected to ostracism or prejudice outside the purview of Jewish law. Two transsexuals told me about receiving rabbinic advice to live their lives as new persons, presumably in line with their phenotypic sex, and one was advised to relocate to a new Orthodox community and keep their past as the other sex secret. 54 Nevertheless, in the sex-divided world of Jewish Orthodoxy, if genotype implies rejection, phenotype implies acceptance.
Ben-Ephraim, however, shows that Jewish law need not be collapsed into a binary choice between rejection and acceptance. Since he would assign halakhic sex by natal phenotype, we might expect that he would have communities exclude transsexuals who present as their surgically reconstructed sex. Instead, Ben-Ephraim advances a key regulatory principle for absorbing transsexuals into Jewish life: While they retain their preoperative halakhic sexual identity, they may, in effect, be treated consistently with their postoperative, transitioned appearance for the purpose of Jewish laws governing the public sphere and social relations. 55 This socializing principle modulates the rejectionist impulse of genotypic and natal-phenotypic sex assignment. 56 With this discretionary principle in hand, Ben-Ephraim makes a herculean effort to figure out when and how the conventional sex roles can be waived for the transsexual. He reevaluates about two dozen areas of Jewish law where a transsexual's sex assignment would matter. The list of Jewish legal topics is itself revealing (see the Appendix). While questions about marriage, divorce and sexual relations have received the most sustained attention, Ben-Ephraim's list shows the extent to which religious law might claim to regulate the bodies of transsexuals, with respect to their physical contact with other bodies, the company they keep, their voices and clothing, private ritual non-performance (blessings, circumcision and numerous other mitzvot), participation in public ritual (prayer leading, Torah reading, synagogue seating, mourner's kaddish), their legal and economic rights and roles (inheritance, witnessing) and even disposal of their earthly remains.
Rabbinic discourse is gradually making special accommodations for transsexuals, as either imagined or genuine participants in Orthodox life. Ben-Ephraim explores creatively-and unflinchingly-how halakhic regulations for transsexuality may be refined and justified. 57 For example, to avoid impropriety, the seclusion of unmarried individuals of opposite sexes is forbidden. However, Ben-Ephraim states that an MtF transwoman may be secluded with a woman but not with a man, even though the MtF is a genotypic and hence a halakhic male. Ben-Ephraim's social interactions principle can have curious results. For instance, although women in Orthodoxy generally are not given the honor of an 'aliyah during public reading of the Torah, Ben-Ephraim states that FtM persons may be given this honor, despite their halakhic status as females, because they pass as men publicly. 58 This innovative regulatory scheme is rooted, I believe, in Ben-Ephraim's commitment to natal phenotype as a new halakhic sexual identity marker. How does he justify this approach to sexual identity in halakhic and Jewish terms?
The Souls of Transsexuals
To better understand Ben-Ephraim's hybrid approach to transsexual identity, let us delve into the heart of Dor tahepukhot. As I hinted above, even as Ben-Ephraim details the halakhic prohibitions against SCS, in subtle and perhaps unintended ways he shows that most prohibitions might be unraveled. In other words, the book states that SCS is completely sinful ab initio, and yet, in the fine print, Ben-Ephraim finds ways to qualify, limit or undermine the rabbinic law on transsexuals.
In one remarkable section (pp. 69-82), Ben-Ephraim seeks to settle the question of halakhic sex by examining the human soul from a kabbalistic perspective. 59 Questions about the soul have been raised by Catholic ethicist Bernard Guevin, too, on the basis of the belief of many transsexuals that they have the soul of a female in a male body, or vice versa. Guevin argues against the notion of a sexed soul. 60 However, Ben-Ephraim treats the soul as sexually identified from the time of its creation and as the basis for determining halakhic sex. 61 Ben-Ephraim begins with the kabbalistic view that the body is merely the garment of the soul. Moreover, it is the Jewish soul that is instructed to observe the commandments (p. 72). Non-Jews, he asserts, do not have a neshamah-the highest level of soul-but rather a nefesh ḥayah (roughly: a life force); hence God sends each convert a neshamah upon conversion (p. 73). There is a strong kabbalistic tie between the character of the soul and the degree of one's obligation for commandments (mitzvot). Since women are not obligated to fulfill as many commandments as men, it can be inferred that women have different souls (p. 74). Moreover, Ben-Ephraim adduces kabbalistic sources to show that no bodily changes can disrupt the commandments laid upon a soul (p. 75). He states an interim conclusion: "It is clear that humans do not change sex through surgical means, and surgery does not raise or lower one's obligation to Torah commandments, because the essence of the obligation of commandments is derived from the unchanging human soul" (p. 76). In other words, he posits that Jewish law governs only the soul, which is untouched by surgery.
Delving further into the Jewish mysteries of the soul, however, Ben-Ephraim finds an apparently conflicting kabbalistic view. What if a soul does not match its body's sex? Ben-Ephraim points to a series of rabbinic texts indicating that a man might occasionally be given a feminine soul and consequently would act like a woman. Nevertheless, he would still be fully obligated as a man, due to his unaltered male body. Dor tahepukhot (pp. 76f) analyzes a series of rabbinic references to a soul's sex changes or sex reversal, based mainly on kabbalistic interpretations of biblical and talmudic texts. 62 He also brings the case of the masculine soul of the wife of Ḥayim Vital, a founder of Lurianic kabbalah. These cases would seem to disprove his previous hypothesis that Jewish law governs only the soul:
Certainly, in such a case, we do not say that this man is obligated for commandments like women, since his soul is the soul of a woman, but rather he is With this rhetorical about-face, which the text does not foreshadow in its preceding emphasis on the soul, Ben-Ephraim shifts to the body as the locus of Jewish norms.
At this juncture, Dor tahepukhot brings rabbinic texts to show how the commandments may be grounded in the body, not the soul. Ben-Ephraim tries to reconcile the competing kabbalistic views. He is persuaded that, although it was the soul that received the fundamental order to obey the commandments, it is the ensouled body (male or female) that serves to determine the concrete, sex-differentiated law for each person. 63 Thus, he concludes, because the body's original sex is unchanged, SCS cannot alter halakhic obligations and sexual identity (p. 81). Yet Dor tahepukhot seems tentative about this chain of inferences, since the author declares that truth is elusive: more needs to be revealed; man is unable to discern God's secrets; even the masters of kabbalah felt they had not totally grasped the truth; and so on. 64 Ben-Ephraim then tackles evidence about bodily changes that could trip up the last step in his argument. Assuming now that halakhic duties are bound up with the body, Ben-Ephraim turns to analyzing a hodgepodge of body transformations in rabbinic literature, including: -Pelaggi's responsum about a married woman who changed into a man; -the "natural transformations" of one species into another, such as hyenas turning into bats after seven years, per BT Bava kama 16a; -the monthly change in sex of an androginos; -lycanthropy and other transformations of humans into animals, including cat, donkey and monkey, caused by divine intervention or sorcery; -the aforementioned sex reassignment in utero of the biblical character of Dinah; -the transformation of Nebuchadnezzar into a beast and back again, based on Dan. 4:29f, and instances of people who were changed by living among or being raised by monkeys or wolves. (pp. [82] [83] [84] [85] While these cases may appear legendary, they serve Ben-Ephraim as precedents, since in some of them the applicable Jewish law could be said to have shifted with the bodily transformations.
Since rabbinic texts thus could be shown to recognize that halakhic sex can vary with transformations in the body, one might suppose that Jewish law could likewise shift with the body as transformed by sex change surgery. However, Ben-Ephraim argues that there is a difference between "natural" or "divine" transformations and those wrought surgically. He asserts that, since the above sex or species transitions were natural and divinely ordained, they do not disprove his claim that artificial, unnatural surgery cannot truly alter a person's halakhic sex. In the end, he concludes that "the human soul and the original form of its creation" determine Jewish law's obligations and its concomitant assignment of sex (pp. 34, 69, 115).
While such kabbalistic beliefs rarely enter into a halakhic analysis of SCS, BenEphraim's ideas can be taken further. In an unpublished manuscript, another Israeli Orthodox rabbi, Dror Brama, has raised the possibility that a transsexual might be correct in claiming to be placed in the wrong body. Brama, who has worked in London for Torah MiTzion, a religious Zionist institution, and is affiliated with the religious Zionist rabbinic organization Tzohar, compares transsexuality to a form of prophecy, in that a prophetic role may be attributed to people who correctly figure out that their bodies do not match their souls. He does not point to any concrete implications for rabbinic law. 65 In emphasizing the disjuncture between the transsexual person's soul and body, Ben-Ephraim's and Brama's texts resonate with the "wrong body" motif so common in secular discourse by and about transsexuals. In secular settings, it has been typical for a preoperative transsexual to aver that he or she is a woman or man, or a woman's or man's soul, trapped in a body of the opposite sex. 66 This motif became widely known through the story of Christine Jorgensen, the first famous transsexual in the United States. In medical discourse, the "wrong body" construct was highlighted in 1966 by Harry Benjamin, a pioneer in the diagnosis of transsexuality:
[The fully developed transsexual] lives only for the day when his "female soul" is no longer being outraged by his male body, when he can function as a femalesocially, legally, and sexually. 67 In self-disclosures that helped justify their diagnosis and subsequent surgery, transsexuals have frequently voiced this notion of a gendered soul in the wrong body, and Ben-Ephraim adduces it, too (p. 23). 68 Though he does not say so overtly, readers may infer that his in-depth analysis of the kabbalah's concept of a gendered soul is unexpectedly responsive to popular and diagnostic conceptions of transsexuality as a condition of a gendered soul in the wrong body.
Sympathy for the Different? Halakhic Innovations in Transition
Not surprisingly, both the phenotype and the genotype approaches to halakhic sex are developing some mechanisms, albeit limited, to absorb transsexuals into Orthodox Jewish life. Taking either approach, it is feasible under Jewish law to allow transsexual persons to participate in Jewish prayer and ritual activities in their chosen sexual identity. Yet even when their participation is considered technically allowed by Jewish law, social ostracism can make it unworkable. In practice, Jewish transsexuals report that they are welcomed with their reassigned sex in some Orthodox synagogues but not in others. It is unclear whether the practical rule-making for transsexuals, and their occasional integration into Orthodox life, may help alter anti-transsexual rhetoric. In any case, the public now has access to a slow trickle of Orthodox rabbinic viewpoints about transsexuals and their real-life situations. 69 In a concrete route toward leniency, Orthodox Jewish legal discourse has increasingly spoken of transsexuality as a pathology, a form of rabbinically defined mental illness. 70 The medicalization of transsexuality puts seemingly insular Orthodox writings in conversation with non-Jewish discourses, such as those of secular psychology and Catholic bioethics. 71 In a 2008 statement, Brama, who strikes me as one of the more sympathetic Orthodox commentators on SCS, discussed the psychological challenges for preoperative transsexuals. He has written the only Orthodox responsum in my dataset to refer specifically to a psychiatric diagnosis such as gender dysphoria. 72 Brama frames this diagnosis in the premodern rabbinic vocabulary for psychological conditions, arguing that the desire to change one's sex fits the rabbinic category of a person who, though otherwise functional and healthy, is obsessively disturbed about a single matter (shoteh ledavar eḥad). He appreciates ("I write in sorrow") that transsexuals may feel hurt by this rabbinic mental health designation, regardless of the diagnosis they may have received from their doctors. In addition, Brama takes a fascinating stance toward the biological underpinnings of transsexuality. He anticipates that it may well be found to be a biophysical problem rather than a (merely) psychological one, and that it may be treatable by way of medication. In debates over homosexuality, such biological determinism has muted moral criticisms predicated on viewing homosexuality as a preference rather than as a neurophysical condition.
Brama's categorization of transsexuality within Jewish law as a psychological disorder has implications that may be meaningful and beneficial to Orthodox transsexuals. He emphasizes that the obsessive status might exempt transsexuals from sex-differentiated commandments relating to their psychological condition, 73 such as donning tefilin (phylacteries) for a halakhic male, and might open up options for them to participate freely in various sex-segregated practices. 74 He insists, moreover, that transsexuals should be treated like anyone with an illness-that is, with kindness. 75 It seems that a route to compassion, if not to acceptance, is through pathologizing transsexuality.
It is instructive in this regard to compare Brama's views with those taken by halakhic experts within the Conservative movement. Not surprisingly, Conservative Judaism has also moved toward a less restrictive stance toward transsexuals, and its scholars, too, have done so by defining their status as pathological. In the 2003 responsum endorsed by the Committee on Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly, Mayer Rabinowitz defined transsexuality as gender dysphoria, a psychiatric diagnosis described in the DSM. In an appendix, Rabinowitz argued that there may be grounds under Jewish law to allow SCS ab initio, on the basis of the principle of beneficenceof permitting an intervention "for the good of the ill person" (letovat haḥoleh). This dispensation would apply on the basis of the assumption, or even stipulation, that the transsexual suffers from a dysphoria that SCS would treat. In a cautionary tone, Rabinowitz's responsum concludes that the "long-term effectiveness" of SCS has not yet adequately been studied, and pre-operative transsexuals should be counseled to take this lack of sufficient evidence into account. 76 Another Conservative scholar advocates a further step in accepting transsexuals by virtue of their medical condition. Leonard A. Sharzer has proposed that transsexuals be assigned halakhic sex based not merely on postoperative genitalia, as the Rabinowitz responsum had stipulated. Instead, Sharzer would assign halakhic sex purely on the basis of the diagnosis of a psychological condition, gender dysphoria, without requiring SCS. 77 Sharzer's as-yet-unpublished proposal has had little effect on rabbinic discourse on SCS, but it merges conceptually with Ben-Ephraim's approach to transsexuality in halakhah. In both views, sex assignment and transitioning should be evaluated by attention to the psyche or soul.
Conclusion
Over the past forty years, Orthodox Jewish legal discourse has not been static in responding to sex-change surgery. Early commentators expressed the most shock at SCS, disparaged transsexuality harshly and denied its relevance to observant Jews. However, while deprecating sentiments continue to be expressed, rabbinic writings have emerged that approach SCS with more equanimity and take for granted the need to offer guidance.
SCS is increasingly analyzed in practical terms. There has been detailed halakhic analysis of how to regulate the religious observance and social conduct of transsexuals. Over the years, some Orthodox authors have found ways to express sympathy for them. Exposure to other religious and secular medical discourses has led some rabbis and halakhic experts to begin treating transsexuality less as a "deviant" lifestyle choice than as a severe psychological disorder. This shift is opening up interpretive space for further sympathetic responses. In effect, the rabbinic elite within traditionalist Judaism has begun showing its dexterity at conceptualizing the regulatory regime for postoperative transsexual bodies.
To date, the prohibition against SCS remains intact within Orthodox Jewish circles. This bright-line prohibition of SCS is backed up by authoritative precedents, justified by multiple halakhic rules and reinforced by a cross-cultural discourse linking transsexuality to the thorny issue of homosexuality. Most Orthodox rabbis are unlikely to jeopardize their reputation for strict opposition to the latter by showing any leniency toward the former. Nevertheless, a groundwork for change is being laid by recent rabbinic writings, such as Ben-Ephraim's exploration of potential leniencies, Brama's attention to transsexuality as a psychological dysphoria and a few non-Orthodox arguments for permitting SCS ab initio. Orthodox transsexuals are aware that SCS might be condoned ex post facto as an inexorable compulsion, even if it is never officially condoned ab initio. 78 To be sure, these incremental moves at the margins of Orthodox halakhic discourse have so far had minimal impact on the prevailing authorities in North America and Israel.
Although Orthodox Jewish discourse rarely acknowledges any explicit influence from non-Jewish moral discourses, the deliberations over SCS can readily be seen as alluding to outside concerns and responding to non-Jewish norms. Notably, as described above, Jewish law has begun to engage with the pathologizing of transsexuality as a psychological condition. To be sure, from the perspective of transgender persons and their allies, a medicalizing Orthodox rabbinic discourse is trailing recent efforts to depathologize SCS and transsexuality in mainstream society. Yet, within the current context of Orthodox Jewish law, pathologizing is innovative, especially as it appears to echo non-Jewish moral concerns. Other dialogical Jewish interactions with outside views may be inferred from rabbinic conversations about "passing" by transsexuals, from the "the wrong body" discourse that has permeated Orthodox texts, and, arguably, from the asymmetry in Jewish handling of MtF versus FtM transitions. While it is premature to predict the impact of opinions like those of Ben-Ephraim and Brama, these developments suggest that Orthodox halakhic thinking on SCS is gradually transitioning in its responsiveness to the broader social dynamics around transsexuality. 1. For the purposes of this paper, "transsexual/ity" refers to people who seek or have obtained sex change surgery. "Sex-change surgery" (SCS) refers to various surgeries and related medical treatments that Jewish legal discourse would regard as removing or altering sexual organs in order to change sex for a male-to-female (MtF) or female-to-male (FtM) transsexual. For better or worse, Jewish sources do not clarify precisely which surgeries are under discussion. This paper avoids the terms "gender" and "reassignment"
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